Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper not only considers why many concentrated ownership structured systems and jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also explores why the traditional principal agency theory model may no longer apply in many concentrated ownership structures.

Keywords: principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; informational asymmetries; risk; corporate governance; UK; India; Germany; U.S; Japan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D82 D86 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50948/1/MPRA_paper_50948.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69293/1/MPRA_paper_50948.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70895/1/MPRA_paper_50948.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures (2013)
Journal Article: Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures (2013)
Working Paper: Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures (2013)
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