In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity"

Richard Cebula () and Milton Kafoglis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an optimum "relative unanimity” collective decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of moving from simple majority rule towards unanimity are identified. Finally, the issue of an optimal decision rule is mathematically solved.

Keywords: collective decision making; voting; relative unanimity; free-rider problem; unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D74 D78 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982-01-15
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Published in Public Choice 2.40(1983): pp. 195-201

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Related works:
Journal Article: In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’ (1983)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:51015

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