In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity": Reply

Richard Cebula () and Milton Kafoglis

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper extends our analysis of the identification of an "optimum relative unanimity." This is done principally through clarifying certain terms and correcting a misinterpretation of why the minimum possible value for an optimum relative unanimity is a simple majority, i.e., greater than 50%.

Keywords: collective decision-making; majority voting; relative unanimity; constrained optimizing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-11-04
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Published in Public Choice 3.54(1987): pp. 289-290

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Related works:
Journal Article: In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’: Reply (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:51239

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