Potential Theft as an Indirect Tax

Richard Cebula () and Paul Gatons

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This theoretical model demonstrates that there is an excess burden from potential theft similar to that which results from an indirect tax with some positive probability of payment. In addition, the model shows that potential theft creates a bias for consumption to drift away from "steal-able" items to substitute items.

Keywords: risk aversion; indirect taxation; property crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D78 H21 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1973-01-27
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Public Choice 1.20(1974): pp. 109-111

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51563/1/MPRA_paper_51563.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:51563

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().