La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario

Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution

Daniel Fuentes Castro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.

Keywords: Bienes colectivos; bienes comunes; bienes públicos; sobreexplotación; recursos naturales; externalidades (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 Q20 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in Principios / Revista de Economía Política 8 (2007): pp. 5-19

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:51756

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