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Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

Franz Dietrich

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: When individual judgments ('yes' or 'no') on some propositions are aggregated into collective judgments, the agenda setter can sometimes reverse a collective judgment by changing the set of propositions under consideration (the agenda). I define different kinds of agenda manipulation, and axiomatically characterize the aggregation rules immune to each kind. Two axioms emerge as central for preventing agenda manipulation: the familiar independence axiom, requiring propositionwise aggregation, and the axiom of implicit consensus preservation, requiring the respect of any (possibly implicit) consensus. I prove that these axioms can almost never be satisfied together by a (non-degenerate) aggregation rule.

Keywords: judgment aggregation; agenda manipulation; impossibility theorems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51775/1/MPRA_paper_51775.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71303/1/MPRA_paper_71303.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72302/1/MPRA_paper_72302.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation (2016) Downloads
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