Sarbanes Oxley, Non Audit Services (NAS) and the mandatory rotation of audit firms

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Whilst the benefits and potentials of the dual roles assumed by external auditors are emphasized, as well as the need to ensure that safeguards operating to guard against a compromise of objectivity and independence are in place, this paper also highlights the fact that even though such dual roles are appropriate in certain cases – as illustrated by justifications for limitations imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and other relevant and applicable legislation – instances also persist where section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard to internal audit outsourcing, may have been over-reactionary and may continue to hinder both companies and their auditors.

Keywords: independence; objectivity; Sarbanes Oxley Act,; FSMA section 166; non audit services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 G3 K2 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-07, Revised 2013-12-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52073/1/MPRA_paper_52073.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84075/1/MPRA_paper_52073.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69291/1/MPRA_paper_52073.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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