Considering the Pasadena "Paradox"

Robert Vivian ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Nover and Hájek (2004) suggested a variant of the St Petersburg game which they dubbed the Pasadena game. They hold that their game ‘is more paradoxical than the St Petersburg game in several aspects’. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate theoretically and to validate by simulation, that their game does not lead to a paradox at all, let alone in the St Petersburg game sense. Their game does not produce inconsistencies in decision theory.

Keywords: expected values; St Petersburg paradox; decision rules; simulation; harmonic series (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06, Revised 2006-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in South African Journal of Economic & Management Sciences NS9.2(2006): pp. 277-284

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5232

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