Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

Friederike Mengel and Constanza Fosco

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in prisoners' dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-biased imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Whenever agents hold some information beyond their interaction neighbors defectors and cooperators always coexist in disconnected components. Otherwise polymorphic networks can emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Any stochastically stable state has at most two disconnected components. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the speed at which the network evolves, increases with the radius of interaction and decreases with the radius of information.

Keywords: Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks (2011)
Working Paper: Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5258

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