Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Exact Feasibility with Asymmetric Information

Anuj Bhowmik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information. The space of agents is a mixed measure space and the commodity space is an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point. The concept of coalitional fairness introduced in [9] is examined in the framework of asymmetric information. It is shown that the private core is contained in the set of privately coalitionally fair allocations under some assumptions. This result provides an extension of Theorem 2 in [9] to an asymmetric information economy with infinitely many commodities.

Keywords: Asymmetric information economy; Coalitional fairness; Private core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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