A Dynamic Model of Belief-Dependent Conformity to Social Norms

Alessandro Sontuoso

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Human conduct is often guided by “conformist preferences”, which thrive on behavioral expectations within a society, with conformity being the act of changing one’s behavior to match the purported beliefs of others. Despite a growing research line considering preferences for a fair outcome allocation, economic theories do not explain the fundamental conditions for some social norm – whether of fairness or not – to be followed. Inspired by Bicchieri’s account of norms (C.Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society. CambridgeUP [2006]), I develop a behavioral theory of norm conformity building on the Battigalli-Dufwenberg “psychological” framework (P.Battigalli and M.Dufwenberg, Dynamic Psychological Games, J.Econ.Theory, 144:1-35 [2009]).

Keywords: Conformist Preferences; Social Norms; Social Dilemmas; Psychological Game Theory; Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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