On Weak Condorcet Winners: Existence and Uniqueness
Grisel Ayllón ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Consider a society where each agent has weak preferences over alternatives. The purpose of the society is the selection of alternatives using the majority principle. Then, an alternative x (a weak Condorcet winner) is selected if half or more agents agree that x is as least as good as any other alternative. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on preference profiles under which (i) the set of Weak Condorcet Winners is non-empty; and (ii) the Weak Condorcet Winner is unique.
Keywords: Condorcet Winner; Majority Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in PERSPECTIVAS: Revista de análisis de Economía, Comercio y Negocios Internacionales 1.7(2013): pp. 3-14
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:53272
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