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Corruption in union leadership

Sarbajit Chaudhuri () and Krishnendu Dastidar ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage. The analysis leads to some interesting results which are important for anticorruption policy formulation.

Keywords: Corruption; Union; Firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O1 O16 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01-20
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53281