Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni

Leszek Jurdziak ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON OPERATION OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY OF LIGNITE MINE AND POWER PLANT Lignite mine & power plant can operate as two separate entities (having the same or different owners), two entities operating in one holding (with joint owner) or as one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this body including realization of its parts and the whole entity objectives, price negotiation etc. In the paper an attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness.

Keywords: bilateral monopoly; price negotiation; lignite price; Pareto optimal production; Pareto suboptimal solution; co-operation; rivalry; lignite minel power plant (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 L22 L72 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-23, Revised 2006-10-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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