Rent seeking, interest groups and environmental lobbying: Cane Farmers versus Great Barrier Reef Protectionists

Rodney Beard

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate.

Keywords: Public choice; Environmental economics; Agricultural policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q18 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5351

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