Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences

Sam Flanders

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided matching model where agents have single peaked preferences and face no costs or restrictions to matching. These algorithms allow matches to be computed as an explicit function of the parameters of the model, making them convenient for use in theoretical matching market models, such as dating markets. One such theoretical model is solved and analyzed. Finally, several possible extensions and topics for further study are explored, such as adding noise to observed types and allowing misreporting of type.

Keywords: Matching Theory; Dating; Marriage; Mathematical Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D01 D10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:53668

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