Branding and Collusion in Vertically Differentiated Industries

Daniel Garcia

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper presents a model of collusion in vertically differentiated industries where firms have the option to make their products distinguishable to consumers by attaching a brand. We show that if consumers’ preferences are linear in the quality dimension and their beliefs satisfy a standard refinement, collusion is facilitated in the absence of brands. More precisely, we show that if collusion is feasible with brands it is also feasible without them

Keywords: Collusion; Branding; Vertical Differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mkt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:54010

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