Corruption and Informality: Complements or Substitutes? Qualitative Evidence from Barranquilla, Colombia

Maxie-Lina Mehling and Frédéric Boehm

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We present results of a qualitative study based on interviews with informal vendors and experts on informality carried out in Barranquilla, Colombia, in order to investigate whether corruption and informality are complements or substitutes. It was found that it is necessary to distinguish between bureaucratic and political corruption when examining the relation with informality, as the results can be opposite. In Barranquilla, bureaucratic corruption and informality seem to be substitutes, while political corruption and informality complement each other.

Keywords: Corruption; Informality; Colombia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-lam, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54817/1/MPRA_paper_54817.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:54817

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().