Work cycles of independent ensembles

Thomas Friedrich

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The active and independent ensemble is redistributing substrate from source to sink, controlling internal giving and taking by its own. This will lead to superadditivity in comparison to the inactive ensemble. The surface area of superadditivity differs from dependent ensembles. The line of strict symbiosis is unchanged. The symmetric independent ensemble will not be irrational or subadditive or show signs of antibiosis as long as internal giving by source and taking by sink ends at b-c=0 (b/c=1). The use of brute force and deception shifts this border into an area where the ensemble was inactive before. A subadditive and therefore irrational area appears in asymmetric ensembles as well as in symmetric ensembles with transfer costs. There, giving and taking takes place although the inactive ensemble has a higher productivity. In case the ensemble alternates between a connected and an unconnected phase work cycles appear. In the connected phase a costing good is transferred to become an earning good. In the unconnected phase the starting point for a new cycle is created by over-accumulation in source and by over-consumption in sink. Work cycles may include brute force and deception to further increase the transferred amount within the independent ensemble. A surprising outcome of my model is the observation that a complete rational independent and active ensemble may end in irrationality being less productive than an inactive ensemble.

Keywords: dependent ensemble; independent ensemble; irrationality; source; sink; superadditivity; subadditivity; deception; brute force; peaceful ensemble; violent ensemble; work cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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