Incentive and normative analysis on sequencing problem

Parikshit De

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We identify the complete class of transfer rules that guarantee strategyproofness of any non-increasing in completion time allocation rule for the sequencing problem. We then characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying efficiency of decision (or aggregate cost minimization), egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness. There is no mechanism in this class that satisfies either feasibility or weak group strategyproofness. Finally we identify the restrictions under which egalitarian equivalence, efficiency of decision, identical preference lower bound and strategyproofness are compatible.

Keywords: Sequencing problems; Strategyproofness; Egalitarian equivalence; Identical preference lower bound (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:55127

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