An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals

Maggie Foley (), Richard Cebula () and Robert Boylan

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that shareholder proposals are excluded mainly due to sponsors’ lack of experience and knowledge, rather than as a self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain bargaining power or to simply annoy management. We also find that most shareholder proposals are omitted because they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.

Keywords: corporate governance; shareholder proposals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 G30 G32 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-20
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55432/1/MPRA_paper_55432.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:55432

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