Liquidation in the Face of Adversity: Stealth Vs. Sunshine Trading, Predatory Trading Vs. Liquidity Provision
Torsten Schoeneborn and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Torsten Schöneborn
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We consider a multi-player situation in an illiquid market in which one player tries to liquidate a large portfolio in a short time span, while some competitors know of the seller's intention and try to make a pro¯t by trading in this market over a longer time horizon. We show that the liquidity characteristics, the number of competitors in the market and their trading time horizons determine the optimal strategy for the competitors: they either provide liquidity to the seller, or they prey on her by simultaneous selling. Depending on the expected competitor behavior, it might be sensible for the seller to pre-announce a trading intention (\sunshine trading") or to keep it secret (\stealth trading").
Keywords: Liquidity; liquidity crisis; liquidity provision; optimal liquidation strategies; predatory trading; sunshine trading; stealth trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G12 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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