Legal Enforcement against Illegal Imitation in Developing Countries

Keishun Suzuki

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of seizing illegal imitations within developing countries on imitation, innovation, and economic growth. The model shows four main results. First, a higher seizure rate does not always decrease imitative activity in the South because it may encourage the infringer to commit repeated offenses. Second, the model shows a U-shaped relationship between innovation and the strengthening seizure rate. Third, numerical analysis indicates that a sufficiently high seizure rate that is larger than a critical value is required to enhance economic growth. Finally, unlike seizure, the extended model shows that a prohibition on importing Southern illegal imitations in the North necessarily lowers imitative activities.

Keywords: Innovation; North-South; Seizing Illegal Imitation; Import Prohibition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Related works:
Journal Article: Legal enforcement against illegal imitation in developing countries (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:55535

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