Truth in Economic Subjectivism

Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The notion of subjectivism has a significant place in the body of economic theory, most notably in the theory of economic value. There is, however, one concern that some philosophers have raised about truth in normative judgments that puts economic subjectivism seriously into question. This concern can be articulated as the following question: Do economic value judgments have truth values? The answer to this question is pertinent not only for an improved understanding of economic value but also for such philosophical investigations as realism, epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Nonetheless, the answer is not readily available in the body of economic theory. This paper argues that the truth or falsity of economic judgments can be settled objectively.

Keywords: subjective economic value; subjectivism; objectivism; economic judgments; moral realism; social ontology; philosophy of economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N01 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-10
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Published in Journal of Markets and Morality 2.1(1998): pp. 158-168

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