Interpersonal Bundling

Yongmin Chen and Tianle Zhang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies a model of interpersonal bundling, in which a monopolist offers a good for sale under a regular price and a group purchase discount if the number of consumers in a group---the bundle size---belongs to some menu of intervals. We find that this is often a profitable selling strategy in response to demand uncertainty, and it can achieve the highest profit among all possible selling mechanisms. We explain how the profitability of interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size may depend on the nature of uncertainty and on parameters of the market environment, and discuss strategic issues related to the optimal design and implementation of these bundling schemes. Our analysis sheds light on popular marketing practices such as group purchase discounts, and offers insights on potential new marketing innovation.

Keywords: Interpersonal bundling; bundling; group purchase; group discount; demand uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56165/1/MPRA_paper_56165.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56169/3/MPRA_paper_56169.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interpersonal Bundling (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56165

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