Risque politique,démocratie et dictature

Political Risk,democracy and dictatorship

Bertrand Lemmenicier and Essaid Tarbalouti

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The object of this article is to explain the paradox of the emergence of the dictatorial regime in the poor countries in spite of its negative effects on the economic development within the framework of the theory of the risky choices. The explanation moved forward in this article for the choice of the political system is the arbitration enter the alternative income which a politician can get himself except the political sphere in the rich countries and in the poor countries and the political cost or of corruption. To demonstrate this analysis, we use the level of personal corruption as indicator of enrichment in the various countries and the political cost or corruption in case of failure. This cost is supposed weakness compared with the alternative income. It is regressive in a dictatorship and Progressive in a democracy considering the level of high alternative income. The theoretical demonstration established on its hypotheses determines the political system in most of the rich and poor countries.

Keywords: Political system; democracy; dictatorship; alternative Income; corruption; political cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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