L’actionnariat éthique: une solution aux conflits successoraux des entreprises familiales

The ethical shareholding: a solution to the inheritance conflicts of the family companies

Essaid Tarbalouti, Mohamed Hamdaoui and Abderrazak Ouali

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this article, we wish to understand if, in a family company potentially torn by the conflict of the succession, ethical crucial concern as the aversion in the disparity between heirs allow to reduce in a significant way the temptation of the successors to defend their interests by provoking the failure of the company and thus its explosion to obtain their part to the detriment of the employees and the other entrepreneurs rather than defend the decision of the continuation of the company be collective various constituents of the company. Developing us a model from which, we deduct the conditions under which the explosion of the company is envisaged and the solutions which allow to reduce the failures and thus the liquidation.

Keywords: Succession; divisibility; indivisibility; disparity of income; liquidation of companies. Company (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 K20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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