DEFAUT DE PAIEMENT, COMPORTEMENT DE SAUVE-QUI-PEUT ET TRAITEMENT DES CREANCIERS

DEFAULT, BEHAVIOR OPPORTUNISTIC AND TREATMENT OF THE CREDITORS

Essaid Tarbalouti

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article analyzes the economic effeciency of legal rules of bankruptcy. It aims to answer the following question : do the legal rules of bankruptcy allow an efficient solution to the problem of sauve-qui-peut or opportunistic behavior inherent in bankruptcy firm ? I adopt a model of games theory between two creditors. I define the condition of strategic behavior emergency and demonstrate who bears the cost. I analyze the impact of legal rules on the reduction of the strategic behavior. I demonstrate none of these rules of law is adequate to solve the problem of bankruptcy efficiently. I provide a new rule of contrat, and show how my analysis of the contrat infuence the strategic behavior.

Keywords: legal rules; behavior opportunistic; Default; economic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G33 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56631

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