Core and Coalitional Fairness: The Case of Information Sharing Rule

Anuj Bhowmik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate two of the most extensively studied cooperative notions in a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information. One of them is the core and the other is known as coalitional fairness. The set of agents is modelled by a mixed market consisting of some large agents and an ocean of small agents; and the commodity space is an ordered Banach space whose positive cone has an interior point. The information system in our framework is the one introduced by Allen in [1]. Thus, the same agent can have common, private or pooled information when she becomes member of different coalitions. It is shown that the main results in Grodal [20], Schmeidler [26] and Vind [31] can be established when the economy consists of a continuum of small agents. We also focus on the information mechanism based on size of coalitions introduced in [18] and obtain a result similar to the main result in [18]. Finally, we examine the concept of coalitional fairness proposed in [21]. We prove that the core is contained in the set of coalitionally fair allocations under some assumptions. This result provides extensions of Theorem 2 in [21] to an economy with asymmetric information as well as a deterministic economy with infinitely many commodities. Although we consider a general commodity space, all our results were so far unsolved to the case of information sharing rule with finitely many commodities.

Keywords: Asymmetric information economy; coalitional fairness; core; information sharing rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56644/1/MPRA_paper_56644.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57372/1/MPRA_paper_56644.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57373/6/MPRA_paper_57373.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:56644

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().