Incentive, status and thereafter: A critical survey

Oindrila Dey and Swapnendu Banerjee (Bandyopadhyay)

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive like status. We intend to summarize the different studies in a concise manner and comment on the divergent views on valuation for status, relation between monetary and status incentives, the technique of modeling status and on the cost of introducing status. We also underline the some probable adverse consequences associated with the use of status incentive. In this paper it also highlights the problem associated with asymmetric information in the labour market, specifically, the (post contractual) moral hazard problem.

Keywords: Status; incentives; principal –agent problem; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57058/1/MPRA_paper_57058.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57117/1/MPRA_paper_57058.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().