The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia

Fernando Estrada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling / Nozick / Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author’s scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (ar- gumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, Nozick’s agencies and the protection, and Gambetta’s recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.

Keywords: Schelling; War Civil; State; Gambetta; Leviathan; Cartel Markets; Organized crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D43 D8 D85 Y80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Published in Perfil de Coyuntura Económica I.17(2011): pp. 165-194

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Related works:
Journal Article: The logic of the violence in the civil war: The armed conflict in Colombia (2011)
Working Paper: The logic of the violence in the civil war: the armed conflict in Colombia (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57160

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