Firmes industrielles incitations et formation approche théorique

Industrial firms incentives and training Policy theoretical approach

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper provides a theory of rational offer of training policy and efficiency wage by industrial firms. We show that the main determinants of training Policy depends on the level of qualification of workers, the level of control within the firm and its productive structure. The optimal training policy is discontinuous and our model does not exclude the possibility of lack of training policy. Indeed, for a low level of qualification, firms have no incentive to provide training to workers. Finally, the model shows that the profile of the efficiency wage increases with the amount of training , hence our theory is able to explain the positive correlation between high wages and training.

Keywords: Efficiency Wage; Training Policy; Human Capital Productivity; Industrial Firms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 J3 J31 M53 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57306

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