Diaspora transferts et signal de richesse

Diaspora remittances and signaling wealth game

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows that social interactions can induce families of migrants to care about hierarchical social status because it serves as a signal device of non-observable income. Hence , a concern for social status induces theses families to engage in conspicuous consumption in order to signal their relative wealth. Consequently, the model shows a positive correlation between disposable income and consumption of the positional good . As a corollary, families who receive large remittances tendto invest more in the signaling game of wealth.

Keywords: Diaspora; Remittances; Status Seeking; Conspicuous Consumption; Signaling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 D03 D1 D11 D64 F22 F24 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mig
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57356

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