Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite

Diaspora famille and transfers as implicit cintract

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a two-period model of migration and remittances as implicit contract in a context of asymmetric information. Our model offers new theoretical findings with respect to the previous literature on the main determinants of remittances. According to self-interest thesis, migrants make transfers in order to insure themselves against the risk of migration return. The low-skilled migrants are more likely to return to home country when informational symmetry is restored, then among others things, their optimal transfers is a decreasing function of the migrant's skill level and increasing function of the family’s wealth level

Keywords: Diaspora; Education; Transfers; Incomplete Information; Implicit Contrat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 F22 F24 I25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mig
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57387

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