Перекрестные права собственности и их влияние на эффективность вертикальной интеграции предприятий

Cross-ownership and its influence on vertical integration efficiency of enterprises

Georgiy Kolesnik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The effect of property rights allocation on characteristics of the vertically integrated company and properties of the corresponding market equilibria are studied. It is shown that partial integration can induce inefficient super-monopolistic market equilibria and unbalance in the functioning of the elements of vertically-integrated structure.

Keywords: property rights; investment; conflict of interests; vertical integration; competition; monopoly; market equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-14
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Published in Audit and financial analysis 3 (2012): pp. 130-139

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