Family attention care and transfers

Mohamed Jellal ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the pure exchange motive for intergenerational transfers within the family. We consider a model where a parent offers a financial transfer in exchange for the care services of the child. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the optimal attention care-money contract between the generations. We prove that the amount of gift received may be either positively or negatively related with the child's income. In addition, the relationship between the two variables is non linear and affected by the parent's degree of risk aversion. This non linearity, which has been largely neglected to date in empirical analyses, may explain why the exchange transfer motive has received little support in developed countries

Keywords: Family; Inter Generational Transfers; Filial Exchange Attention; Care giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D31 J1 J14 J19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-12
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