Search and Ripoff Externalities

Mark Armstrong

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper surveys models of markets in which some consumers are "savvy" while others are not. We discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals available to non-savvy consumers in the market (the case of search externalities), and when the non-savvy fund generous deals for savvy consumers (ripoff externalities). We also discuss when the two groups of consumers have aligned or divergent views about market interventions. The analysis covers two overlapping families of models: those which examine markets with price/quality dispersion, and those which exhibit forms of consumer hold-up.

Keywords: Consumer protection; consumer search; price dispersion; hold-up; add-on pricing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D18 D8 L13 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57958/1/MPRA_paper_57958.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Search and Ripoff Externalities (2015)
Working Paper: Search and ripoff externalities (2015)
Working Paper: Search and Ripoff Externalities (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:57958

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