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Option Pricing in an Oligopolistic Setting

Marcelo Villena and Mauricio Villena
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mauricio G. Villena () and Mauricio G. Villena ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Option valuation models are usually based on frictionless markets. This paper extends and complements the literature by developing a model of option pricing in which the derivative and/or the underlying asset have an oligopolistic market structure, which produces an expected return on these assets that exceeds (or goes below) their fundamental value, and hence affects the option valuation. Our formulation begins modeling a capital asset pricing model that takes into account an oligopolistic setting, and hence the standard option pricing formula is derived, but this time considering the level of market power into the model. Our results show that higher levels of market power will lower the required expected return, in comparison to the perfectly competitive CAPM model. Similarly, simulations show that higher levels of market power in the derivative markets tend to increase the call option values in comparison to those values given by the standard Black and Scholes formulation, while the impact of market power in the underlying asset market tends to lower the option price.

Keywords: Capital Asset Pricing; Option Pricing; Oligopolistic Markets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-01, Revised 2014-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-fmk
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