Population-Monotonicity of the Nucleolus on a Class of Public Good Problems

Tayfun Sönmez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Sprumont (1990) shows that the Shapley value (Shapley 1957) is population-monotonic (Thomson 1983) on the class of convex games (Shapley 1971). In this paper we study the population-monotonicity of the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969). We show that the nucleolus is not population-monotonic on the class of convex games. Our main result is that the nucleolus is population-monotonic on a class of public good problems which is formalized in Litilechild and Owen (1973) under the name of airport games. We also provide a recursive formula for the nucleolus of the airport game.

Keywords: Population-monotonicity; airport game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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