The Constitutional Choice of Bicameralism

Abhinay Muthoo and Kenneth Shepsle

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We take a garden-variety instance of distributive politics-- a divide-the-cake stage game -- and explore dynamic extensions in different institutional settings: (i) repeated play of the stage game in a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature; (ii) repeated play in a staggered-term unicameral legislature; and (iii)repeated play in a bicameral setting of one staggered-term and one simultaneous-term legislative chamber. We are then able to entertain decisions taken at "the constitutional moment" regarding which institutional forms to employ.

Keywords: institutions; distributive politics; repeated divide-the-cake games; bicameralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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