Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We develop a framework in which individuals preferences co-evolve with their abilities to deceive others regarding their preferences and intentions. We show that a pure outcome is stable, essentially if and only if it is an efficient Nash equilibrium. All individuals have the same deception ability in such a stable state. In contrast, there are non-pure outcomes in which non-Nash outcomes are played, and different deception abilities co-exist. We extend our model to study preferences that depend also on the opponent's type.

Keywords: Evolution of Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach, Theory of Mind; Depth of Reasoning; Deception. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58255/1/MPRA_paper_58255.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63012/1/MPRA_paper_63012.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76772/1/MPRA_paper_76772.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79731/1/MPRA_paper_79731.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89123/1/MPRA_paper_89123.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66177/1/MPRA_paper_66177.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli (2020)
Journal Article: Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:58255

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().