Competitiveness and environmental protection: a dirty dilemma

Geoffrey Oliver and Rishi Basak ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Environmental authorities are regularly challenged to defend their regulations and policies in terms of how they impose additional costs on business and affect economic competitiveness. This paper discusses the links between environmental protection (and government policies and regulations more generally) and competitiveness. It provides a brief discussion on the nature of competitiveness, presents a Prisoners’ Dilemma model of firm and government strategies that incorporates competition, and briefly relates the results of these investigations to key empirical results from the literature.

Keywords: environmental protection; competitiveness; competition; Prisoners’ Dilemma; sustainable development; globalisation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 F18 Q5 Q54 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02-19, Revised 2004-02-19
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Published in International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development Volume 1, Number 3.1(2004): pp. 265-282

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:58416

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