Los problemas epistemológicos del relativismo

Epistemological problems of relativism

Fernando Estrada

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The hypothesis in this paper is to defend the idea that the dichotomy between facts and theories, conceptual framework or paradigm uninterpreted experience and world, is a profound error (Davidson), born of an essentially incoherent image of the mind as a spectator passive but critical of an internal libraries (Quine). From a naturalistic account of knowledge, Davidson maintains that requires no appeal to epistemological intermediaries such as facts, data or pure sensory sensations. As a corollary of this thesis supports the search for a foundation of evidence for knowledge is meaningless and is not a suitable position to be even asked.

Keywords: Epistemology; Relativism; Quine; Davidson (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Y8 Z1 Z11 Z13 Z18 Z19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia 14 - 15.VII(2006): pp. 93-106

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