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A Economia das Firmas Cooperadas e a Análise Antitruste

The Economics of Cooperative Firms and the Antitrust Analysis

Luiz Esteves

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The economic literature has spent decades of analytical effort in order to provide theoretical and empirical evidence on behavior differences between firms managed by capital (conventional capitalist firms) and firms managed by labor (including cooperatives and professional associations), mainly in respect to their goals. Conventional capitalist firms aim to maximize profits, while the cooperative firms aim employment and output stability. The antitrust policy have replicated the same treatment used to analyze conventional capitalist firms in order to analyze cooperative firms. Such behavior can increase the probability of type I and type II errors. In terms of public policy, the conclusion of this article is that a concentration or coordination between cooperative or professional associations is not, per se, a necessary and sufficient condition to cause competitive harm. The idiosyncrasies of these types of organizations require specific analysis and application of the rule of reason.

Keywords: Antitrust; Cooperatives; Monopolies; Cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 K21 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme
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