Risk, ambiguity and sovereign rating

Paolo Di Caro ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Decisions of investing in sovereign assets involve both risk and ambiguity. Ambiguity arises from unknown elements characterizing the value of a generic sovereign. In presence of ambiguity, ambiguity-averse investors are prone to pay for obtaining summary information such as ratings which reduces ambiguity. Ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-averse investors, then, make decisions on the basis of different informative sources. By presenting a simple model of sovereign rating under ambiguity, three facts occurring in today’s financial markets are explained. Sovereign ratings influence decisions of investment of ambiguity-sensitive individuals. Rating-dependent regulations create distortions in financial markets by institutionalising specific summary signals. Providing ratings may be a profitable activity. Some final suggestions propose future areas of theoretical and empirical research.

Keywords: risk; ambiguity; ambiguity aversion; sovereign rating; value of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D81 G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60295/1/MPRA_paper_60295.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Risk, ambiguity, and sovereign rating (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:60295

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().