On the number of licenses under symmetric versus asymmetric information with signaling

Manel Antelo and Antonio Sampayo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their period-1 output may signal that value. We find that two licensees are more likely to be preferred under asymmetric information with signalling than under symmetric information.

Keywords: Licensing; symmetric and asymmetric information; profit-based payments; monopoly; duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:60759

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