On the Sustainability of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfection

Sugata Marjit, Arijit Mukherjee and Lei Yang

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank financed Cournot duopoly when firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations without or with credit rationing. When there is no credit rationing moderately higher cost of external finance may affect the degree of collusion, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected. Permanent adverse demand shock in this set up does not affect the possibility of collusion, but may aggravate the finance constraint and eventually lead to collusion. We also discuss the case with credit rationing.

Keywords: Collusion; Credit Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Sustainability of Product Market Collusion Under Credit Market Imperfection (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:60832

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