Construction Corrupts: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of 42 Countries

Andreas Kyriacou, Leonel Muinelo-Gallo and Oriol Roca-Sagalés

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The construction sector, whether privately or publically financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention. Not surprisingly then, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of corruption in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. We control for a range of potentially counfounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to worsen perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.

Keywords: Corruption; Construction Sector; Empirical Estimates; Reverse Causality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 L74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:61457

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