Incentives and Risks in Relationships Between the Principal and the Agent

Vigen Minasyan ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper addresses a basic model of moral hazard (risk) [Gibbons, 2010; Gibbons, 2005] and suggests some of its modifications. In the basic model of moral risk, questions are put and examined that have not been considered in the previous researches. In particular, it is proved that the level of agent's efforts that maximizes its expected utility coincides with the level of efforts that minimize the risk of obtaining this maximum utility. Modifications of the moral risk model are considered where the optimal behavior of the principal and the agent considerably differ from the respective behavior in the moral risk model. The paper introduces moral risk measures VaR for the principal and VaR for the agent that specify the qualitative assessments of risk on the part of the principal and the agent in their relationships.

Keywords: model of moral hazard (risk); expected utility; VaR for the principal; VaR for the agent; measure of the utility risk; lognormally distributed random variable. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Review 3.2(2014): pp. 159-181

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61469/1/MPRA_paper_61469.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:61469

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().