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The Politics of Industry in Nehru's India

Nasir Tyabji

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper argues that the Indian Managing Agencies that controlled most industrial firms and their associated enterprises were themselves embodiments of pre-industrial forms of capital, accumulated through trading and moneylending. This militated against technological dynamism within the industrial firms because the managing agencies applied a profit maximising calculus across their various business activities, rather than in relationship to any individual firm. The group structure, in fact, facilitated the leakage of surpluses generated in industrial activity into the parallel speculative and money lending interests of the Managing Agents. After independence, the Government’s attempts to reform the industrial sector met resistance from politically influential businessmen who had supported the national anti-colonial movement. The British Government also interceded here. The social engineering that these reforms entailed, embodied in legislation, was thwarted by the combined pressures exerted by affected businessmen, but this should not prevent an appreciation of what the state was attempting.

Keywords: Managing Agencies; Merchant Capital; Usury Capital; Indian entrepreneurship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 G38 K23 K42 M14 N25 P12 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-hpe
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